Preface |
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xi | |
PART ONE Introduction |
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1 | (66) |
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What Is Industrial Organization? |
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3 | (12) |
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4 | (2) |
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6 | (5) |
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11 | (4) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercise |
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13 | (2) |
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15 | (20) |
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15 | (3) |
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18 | (6) |
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24 | (2) |
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26 | (9) |
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29 | (1) |
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29 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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30 | (3) |
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33 | (2) |
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35 | (14) |
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Do Firms Maximize Profits? |
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35 | (5) |
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What Determines the Firm's Boundaries? |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (7) |
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45 | (1) |
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45 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (3) |
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49 | (18) |
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Dominant Strategies, Dominated Strategies, and Nash Equilibrium |
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51 | (4) |
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Sequential Games: Commitment and Backward Induction |
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55 | (4) |
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59 | (8) |
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62 | (1) |
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63 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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63 | (3) |
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66 | (1) |
PART TWO From Monopoly to Perfect Competition |
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67 | (32) |
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69 | (16) |
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69 | (6) |
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75 | (3) |
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Essential Facilities and Access Pricing |
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78 | (7) |
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82 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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83 | (2) |
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Perfect (and Almost Perfect) Competition |
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85 | (14) |
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85 | (2) |
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From Theory to Stylized Facts |
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87 | (2) |
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89 | (2) |
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91 | (3) |
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94 | (5) |
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96 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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96 | (3) |
PART THREE Oligopoly |
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99 | (66) |
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101 | (26) |
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102 | (2) |
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Pricing with Capacity Constraints |
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104 | (3) |
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107 | (6) |
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113 | (1) |
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The Models at Work: Comparative Statics |
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114 | (13) |
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124 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (1) |
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127 | (24) |
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Repeated Interaction and the Stability of Collusive Agreements |
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128 | (5) |
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133 | (4) |
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Factors That Facilitate Collusion |
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137 | (7) |
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144 | (7) |
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145 | (1) |
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145 | (1) |
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Review and Practical Exercises |
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146 | (4) |
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150 | (1) |
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Market Structure and Market Power |
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151 | (14) |
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Concentration and Market Power: Theory |
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151 | (5) |
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Concentration and Market Power: Empirical Estimation |
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156 | (3) |
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Conduct and Market Power: Empirical Estimation |
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159 | (6) |
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162 | (1) |
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163 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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163 | (1) |
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163 | (2) |
PART FOUR Price and Nonprice Strategies |
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165 | (74) |
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167 | (22) |
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Types of Price Discrimination |
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169 | (1) |
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Third-Degree Price Discrimination |
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170 | (2) |
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172 | (3) |
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Versioning, Bundling, and Other Forms of Consumer Sorting |
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175 | (5) |
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Is Price Discrimination Legal? Should It Be? |
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180 | (9) |
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183 | (1) |
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184 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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184 | (3) |
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187 | (2) |
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189 | (16) |
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Double Marginalization and Two-Part Tariffs |
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190 | (3) |
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193 | (1) |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (2) |
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196 | (3) |
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Are Vertical Restraints Legal? Should They Be? |
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199 | (6) |
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200 | (1) |
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200 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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201 | (2) |
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203 | (2) |
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205 | (18) |
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Horizontal Differentiation, Vertical Differentiation, and the Characteristics Approach |
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206 | (3) |
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Product Differentiation and Market Power |
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209 | (6) |
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215 | (2) |
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Imperfect Information and Switching Costs |
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217 | (6) |
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219 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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220 | (1) |
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221 | (2) |
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223 | (16) |
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Information, Persuasion, and Signaling |
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223 | (4) |
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227 | (4) |
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Price Competition and Advertising |
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231 | (8) |
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235 | (1) |
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235 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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235 | (2) |
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237 | (2) |
PART FIVE Entry and Exit |
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239 | (50) |
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Entry Costs, Market Structure, and Welfare |
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241 | (18) |
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Entry Costs and Market Structure |
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243 | (4) |
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Endogenous versus Exogenous Entry Costs |
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247 | (5) |
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Free Entry and Social Welfare |
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252 | (7) |
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256 | (1) |
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256 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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256 | (1) |
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257 | (2) |
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Strategic Behavior, Entry and Exit |
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259 | (30) |
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260 | (9) |
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269 | (8) |
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277 | (12) |
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285 | (1) |
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286 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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286 | (2) |
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288 | (1) |
PART SIX Technology |
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289 | (46) |
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291 | (20) |
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Market Structure and Incentives for R&D |
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292 | (3) |
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The Dynamics of R&D Competition |
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295 | (8) |
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303 | (8) |
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308 | (1) |
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308 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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309 | (2) |
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311 | (24) |
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Consumer Expectations and Critical Mass |
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312 | (2) |
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314 | (5) |
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Excess Inertia and Excess Momentum |
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319 | (5) |
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324 | (2) |
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326 | (9) |
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328 | (1) |
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329 | (1) |
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Review and Practice Exercises |
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329 | (2) |
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331 | (4) |
Notes |
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335 | (12) |
Index |
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347 | |