PREFACE |
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iii | (20) |
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xxiii | |
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CHAPTER 1 The Objectives and Origins of Antitrust Law |
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1 | (97) |
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1. The Goals of Antitrust Policy |
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1 | (25) |
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2. The Historical Sources of Antitrust and Modern Implications of Common-Law Cases |
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26 | (72) |
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CHAPTER 2 Institutional Framework of Antitrust Policy |
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98 | (54) |
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1. The Three-Level Antitrust Enforcement Pattern |
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98 | (42) |
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2. The Limits of Antitrust |
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142 | (10) |
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CHAPTER 3 Market Structure and a First Look at the Problem of Monopoly Power |
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152 | (69) |
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1. Monopolization and the Problem of Market Definition |
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152 | (69) |
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CHAPTER 4 Competitor Collaboration on Price Fixing and Division of Markets |
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221 | (141) |
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1. Conspiracy in Theorey and Action |
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221 | (18) |
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2. Development of the "Per se" Rule on Price Fixing |
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239 | (19) |
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3. Characterization Questions and Other Issues |
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258 | (73) |
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4. Division of Territories and Some Other Horizontal Restraints |
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331 | (31) |
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CHAPTER 5 Group Refusal to Deal and Joint Ventures |
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362 | (120) |
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362 | (53) |
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2. Joint Ventures Revisited: Issues of Membership and Access |
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415 | (32) |
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3. Efforts to Influence Government Action |
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447 | (35) |
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CHAPTER 6 Market Concentration, Conspiracy, and the Antitrust Laws |
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482 | (98) |
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1. The Early Failure to Extend Antitrust Remedies to Oligopoly Markets |
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482 | (2) |
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2. Concentration, Price Leadership, and "Conscious Parallelism" |
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484 | (96) |
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CHAPTER 7 Vertical Restraints on Competition |
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580 | (94) |
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1. The Economics of Vertical Restraints |
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580 | (4) |
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2. The Interplay of Common Law and Antitrust Laws |
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584 | (90) |
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CHAPTER 8 Additional Limitations on a Single Firm Exercising Market Power |
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674 | (187) |
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1. Predatory Price Cutting |
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674 | (28) |
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702 | (51) |
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3. Partial Vertical Integration By Contract: Exclusive Selling and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements |
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753 | (33) |
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4. Section 2 Revisited: Special Limits on Single Firm Market Power by Monopolists and Would-Be Monopolists |
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786 | (75) |
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861 | (214) |
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1. Background on Early Merger Law and the Amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 |
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861 | (6) |
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2. Proscribed Effect in Horizontal Mergers |
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867 | (101) |
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3. Joint Ventures, Potential Competition, and Conglomerate Mergers |
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968 | (41) |
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4. Integration Through Vertical Merger |
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1009 | (66) |
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CHAPTER 10 Some Limits on the Reach of Antitrust--Direct Regulation, Federalism, and Comity |
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1075 | (146) |
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1. Antitrust and Direct Federal Regulation |
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1077 | (28) |
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2. "State Action" and Tensions With Federalism |
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1105 | (54) |
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3. "Comity" or Conflict With Foreign Sovereigns |
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1159 | (62) |
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CHAPTER 11 Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act |
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1221 | |
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1. The Economics and Politics of Price Discriminati Legislation |
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1221 | (5) |
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2. Some Jurisdictional Problems and Issues of Language |
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1226 | (8) |
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3. The Anticompetitive Effects of Price Discrimination |
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1234 | (42) |
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1276 | (24) |
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5. Brokerage, Ad Allowances and Services |
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1300 | (8) |
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6. Buyer's Liability for Inducing or Receiving Discriminations in Price |
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1308 | |
Appendix A. Principal Antitrust Statutes |
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1 | (35) |
Appendix B. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations |
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36 | |